Aside from the systematic theory of recognition, Honneth's work in the last decade has also centered around a less commented-upon theme: the critical social theoretic diagnosis of social pathologies. This paper claims first that his diverse diagnoses of specific social pathologies can be productively united through the conceptual structure evinced by second-order disorders, where there are substantial disconnects, of various kinds, between first-order contents and second-order reflexive understandings of those contents. The second major claim of the paper is that once we understand social pathologies as second-order disorders, it becomes apparent that critical social theory must do more than accurately identify and explicate these disorders at the phenomenological and action-theoretic levels. It must further engage in insightful sociological explanations of the social causes of those pathologies in order to further the prognostic and therapeutic tasks implied by the aim of developing a social theory with emancipatory intent. The paper argues that the identificatory and explicative components of diagnostic social theory have been fulfilled by Honneth to a much greater degree than the latter components of explanation, prognosis and therapy. In the light of the attention and interest that Axel Honneth's development of a systematic theory of recognition has generated, it is perhaps not surprising that another of his contributions to reorienting the tradition of critical social theory has garnered less attention. For, aside from continuing the project of grounding the normative standards that critical social theory employs in specific features of human intersubjectivity (in his case, in the formal anthropology of intersubjective recognition), in the last decade or so Honneth has also been substantively engaged in re-animating an older tradition of social philosophy, one that is specifically focused on explicating and diagnosing social pathologies.
In the light of the attention and interest that Axel Honneth's development of a systematic theory of recognition has generated, it is perhaps not surprising that another of his contributions to reorienting the tradition of critical social theory has garnered less attention. For, aside from continuing the project of grounding the normative standards that critical social theory employs in specific features of human intersubjectivity (in his case, in the formal anthropology of intersubjective recognition), in the last decade or so Honneth has also been substantively engaged in re-animating an older tradition of social philosophy, one that is specifically focused on explicating and diagnosing social pathologies.
It is imperative for social philosophy to find a determination and discussion of those developmental processes of society that can be conceived as processes of decline, distortions, or even as "social pathologies." … Social philosophy, in distinction from both moral philosophy and political philosophy, can be understood as an instance of reflection within which measures for successful forms of social life are discussed. 1 Believing that this is indeed a productive reorientation of critical social theory, I intend here to show, first, how Honneth's different social diagnoses exhibit a similar underlying conceptual structure, that of second-order disorders. The first part of the article argues that a number of different social pathologies that Honneth has recently analyzed-those of ideological recognition, maldistribution, invisibilization, rationality distortions, reification, and institutionalized self-realization-all operate by means of second-order disorders, that is, by means of constitutive disconnects between first-order contents and second-order reflexive comprehension of those contents, where those disconnects are pervasive and socially caused.
Once this underlying conceptual structure is grasped, I claim, it becomes clear that there are a number of different tasks a theory designed to diagnose social pathologies must fulfill. For it must not only accurately identify and describe the second-order disorder as a social pathology, it must also be prepared to explain the root social causes of the pathology if it intends to carry out the basic emancipatory aims of a critical social theory. Taking its cue from the relative paucity of explanatory content that might fulfill these latter desiderata in Honneth's substantive analyses of social pathologies, the second part of the article then argues that more attention must be paid to etiological, prognostic and therapeutic concerns. A sufficient diagnosis of social pathologies must do more than simply take note of a complex of related social symptoms; it must also develop a convincing explanation of the social pathologies precisely in order for social members to be able to comprehend the discontinuities between their first-order experiences and their second-order reflexive understandings of them as discontinuities caused by specific social institutions, structures and practices, and for them to productively engage in the manifold social struggles necessary to overcome the causes of the pathological disorders. Said simply, a critical social theory of social pathologies needs not only an accurate explication of pathological disorders at the level of personal experiences, it also needs insightful sociological explanations of the causes of those pathological distortions. My sense is, that at this point in time, the theory of recognition has managed the first task better than the second. Nevertheless, articulating the second-order disorder structure of social pathologies can help to clarify the advantages and 
I: Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders

Ideology and Ideological Recognition
Marx's articulation of a theory of ideology, grounded in an historical materialist social theory, provides a good example of the conceptual structure that this paper claims is central to
Honneth's attempts to reinvigorate the practice of social critique through the diagnosis of social pathologies: namely, the grasp of social pathologies as second-order disorders. The classical concept of ideology investigates first-order beliefs, especially those about the basic structures, orders, and functionings of the social world, and argues that social actors suffer from a cognitive pathology to the extent that they are not cognizant about how and where those beliefs come from. In particular, the social pathology arises to the extent that persons are not aware, at a second-order level of reflexivity, that the current social consensus-a consensus that exerts a tremendous orienting pressure on individuals' belief schemas-is to a significant degree sensitive to and shaped by predominant social powers and class-specific social interests. We can see that ideological beliefs are second-order disorders by comparing them with ordinary instances of mistaken beliefs. In both cases, there is an error at the first-order level: the person holds a false belief about something. But only in the case of ideology is the mistaken belief systematically tied to social formations, and social formations that affect belief formation and stabilization at the second-order level, here by hiding or repressing the needed reflexivity of For example, a belief that the morning star and the evening star are different celestial bodies might arise for any number of reasons particular to an individual's situation-insufficient information, lack of astronomical education, confusions about the particular names used, and so on-and it is not likely that the mistaken belief is rooted in a deformation of second-order cognitive processes, since the mistake is easily corrected when explicitly pointed out. By contrast, a belief that wealth in capitalist societies is dependent entirely on one's individual initiative rather than the amount of capital at one's disposal is an ideological belief: it is rooted in a deformation of the second-order process of belief formation about the characteristics of the extant socio-economic world, the first-order belief and the second-order deformation are both widely shared in society, those deformations systematically serve certain interests in society, and the mistaken belief is not easily corrected. At best, faced with examples and information directly contradicting the first-order ideological belief, individuals will tend to rationalize away contradictions as exceptions to the rule or as biased information in order to save the first-order belief from falsification, in the process also serving to preserve the perceived naturalness and unchangeability of the socio-economic world as presently given. According to the classical theory, these features of ideological belief are explained by second-order distortions in the processes of belief-formation and stabilization that functionally serve to reproduce inegalitarian social structures by hiding their essentially historical character and social causes.
Of course, ideology is not restricted to cognitive beliefs, concerning only true or false
propositions, but also crucially involves normative assessments, their central relation to 
Maldistribution as Distortions of Esteem Dispositives
This higher-order structure of social pathologies is not, however, limited to ideological formations. Let me now briefly review a few other important social diagnoses with specific attention to this structure. Consider first Honneth's recuperation of Dewey's ideal of democracy as a reflexive form of social life. 4 The crucial claims here are, first, that democracy is much more than a specific organization of decision procedures in the formal political domains of the state and allied spheres. According to Dewey, and as approvingly transformed through the insights of recognition theory, democracy is first and foremost a general form for the organization of social cooperation, whereby participants detect problems that affect them collectively and which can only be or can best be solved through reflective collective activity. The second major claim is connected to the fact that effective cooperative activity makes use of the advantages of a division of labour whereby different participants, with different skills and capacities, contribute different components to the collectively determined solution modality. This requires a form of interpersonal recognition, specifically that form centered around the relations of esteem where individuals are treated as worthy co-participants in a differentiated scheme of cooperation. The world of work is here a paradigm example of a form of reflexive social cooperation that requires healthy relations of recognition. Third, such cooperation is valuable not only because it contributes to effective problem resolutions, but more importantly from a recognitional Page 9 of 9 perspective, because it provides an opportunity for the full self-realization of each of the participants. To the extent to which participants are acknowledged for their particular capacities and contributions to the cooperative activity according to a decent schema of evaluative esteem, persons will be able to develop healthy self-esteem. Fourth, the democratic character of social cooperation forms the model of healthy social relations amongst a diverse collection of people interacting through their specific contributions to overall social goals and projects. Thus democracy in this fulsome sense is not only an ideal for political self-government, but is also a crucial desideratum of economic interrelations. In particular, the healthy or distorted character of contemporary economic relations can be judged from the way in which the recognition that individuals achieve through the official economic division of labour matches or does not match the official esteem dispositive that the economy is said to institutionally realize. 
Group-specific Invisibilization
Another example of the analysis of social pathologies as second-order disorders is Honneth's analysis, inspired by Ralph Ellison's novel Invisible Man, of the peculiar structure of social processes of denigration that involve 'looking through or past' another person. 6 Here the curiosity is that social invisibility, especially of persons of denigrated castes, races, and classes, Page 11 of 11
involves an actual form of acknowledgement at a first-order level, but a non-acknowledgement of the person at the second-order. The harmful, disdainful disregard of another is essentially active, involving the activity of purposefully ignoring or looking through another, and this presupposes that one has actually taken cognizance of the presence of the other in order to deny them the normal re-cognition that others are due as fellow persons. Finally, to be a social pathology, active disregard must be essentially connected to social patterns, here caste-like patterns of group-specific denigration. Unlike the phenomena of ideological recognition and maldistributive esteem dispositives, in the case of social invisibilization those who directly suffer from the social effects of the social pathology are not the same as those subject to the problematic form of reflexivity. Nevertheless, the same conceptual structure of a second-order disorder is evident, and critical social theory has a similar role in exposing and explaining it as a social pathology.
Pathologies of Modern Rationality
Many other examples of this connection between social pathologies and second-order disorders could surely be given from the history of critical social thought, broadly construed. It holds in a narrower construal of the Frankfurt School of critical theory as well, as Honneth has shown in his summary article on the core theorists Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas. 
Reification
It seems plausible to me that the same type of analysis could productively illuminate the general forms of misrecognition that Honneth identified over ten years ago-abuse, disrespect, and denigration-and the possibility that they may be generally experienced throughout a societyhence warranting the thesis that one is dealing here with specifically social pathologies. 8 However, the next example I would like to discuss here comes from Honneth's most recent work putting forward a suggestive way of rehabilitating Lukács' concept of reification under changed historical, social, and theoretical conditions. Although these ambitious claims and their supporting arguments deserve a fair amount of critical scrutiny, I accept them here arguendo in order to focus on the use of reification as a critical concept for diagnosing social pathologies. Honneth argues that the concept of reification can be productively re-animated today under changed theoretical and historical conditions by understanding acts of reification as actions in which an objectivating stance to the others, the world, or the self is adopted, while simultaneously forgetting the constitutive connections that such an objectivating stance has to our practical, interested, and normatively laden interactions with others. What is distinctive of reification, as opposed to a benign objectivating stance that serves to promote cognitive values in a normatively permissible manner-say a naturalizing stance that promotes rational problem-solving within a morally delimited sphere of permissible objectivation of others-is that reification involves an active forgetting of the priority of intersubjective recognition to cognition, where that forgetting is socially pervasive and systematically or institutionally reproduced, and serves to deform the networks of intersubjective recognition that are essential conditions for the maintenance of an ethical form of social life.
Thus, the reification of others involves a disregard of the structures of normatively-imbued and meaningful recognition of others, where that disregard is located in distorted forms of sociality that serve to dehumanize participants and thereby perpetuate pathological social structures. A further analysis claims that reification of others can be caused in two analytically distinct ways:
either internally, where individuals more or less consciously adopt a praxis that requires the objectivating stance to overwhelm any limits set by the normative structures of recognition-say engaging in sports where the intensity of competition leads participants to dehumanize their opponents-or externally, through the socially prevalent use of thought schemas and interactive patterns that require participants to approach others as mere objects to be manipulated for self-Page 15 of 15 interested motives-say the structural imperatives of market-mediated interactions where objectivation of others is assumed to be a necessity for bare material survival itself. In either case, reification involves a widely shared disregard of the primordial recognitional structure of intersubjective interactions in favor of objectivation, where that forgetting is socially caused and leads to social pathologies: specifically, pathologies that distort fully humanized interactions, thereby impeding the necessary social conditions for an ethical form of the good life. What is particularly interesting in Honneth's development of these theses is that, more so than in other works focusing on his own diagnoses of contemporary social pathologies, they are supported by substantive and explanatory socio-theoretic claims. Methodologically, the point is made (as it also is in reification analysis) that the symptoms of emptiness and purposelessness arising from institutionalized demands for authentic self-realization are not to be explained in a 
II: The Tasks of a Critical Social Diagnosis of Pathologies
Thus far I have argued that many of the different social pathologies that Honneth has analyzed can be productively understood as exhibiting the conceptual structure of second-order disorders.
In each case, there is a pervasive disconnect between first-order contents and second-order reflexive modes of grasping those contents, and that disconnect is claimed to be widely shared in contemporary society, caused by determinate social structures, institutions and/or cultural patterns, and leading to deleterious consequences for society's members by blocking opportunities for the realization of an ethically-intact form of collective life. Surely this is not the only way in which Honneth's social diagnoses can be reconstructed, but I do believe that it is particularly helpful in illuminating the various tasks a critical social theory must fulfill if it is to vindicate and put to use its proposed social diagnoses. I now turn to articulating four such tasks, before considering three different broad methodological strategies that might be adopted to fulfill them, provisionally indicating for each of the strategies some of their prospective strengths and weaknesses.
The first task, rather obviously, is identifying and explicating the symptomatic phenomena of the social pathology in a revealing way. In line with the action-theoretic and phenomenological approaches Honneth has taken to identification, I have suggested that the articulation of a socially pervasive disconnect between lower-order and higher-order experiential structures can productively illuminate the feelings of suffering, disorientation, meaninglessness, and so on that the analyses take as their primary data. This task of describing the relevant pathological symptoms-what might be called symptomatology-presupposes substantive background assumptions concerning health and normalcy, in this case the health or normalcy of a social form of life, in the light of which the identified phenomena can be said to be pathological. 11 Analyses of social pathologies need further to establish that the described phenomena are pervasively experienced throughout contemporary society. Here the theory must vindicate the claims that the symptoms really exist in a population, and exist in a more than an accidental, episodic, or individualistic manner. This second task of the supporting that claim that we are dealing with social pathologies is then a kind of epidemiology. The third task is etiological: a diagnosis of social pathologies must supply some convincing explanation of their causes. As I have argued here, this will involve giving explanations for the second-order disorders in a way that shows them to be not only socially experienced, but also causally rooted in social structures, institutions, normative patterns, cultural schemas, and so on. A social theory with only descriptive and explanatory ambitions might rest content with fulfilling these three tasks of symptomatology, epidemiology, and etiology, but a critical social theory-an interdisciplinary social theory fundamentally oriented by an emancipatory intent-will need to go further, and begin to fulfill, fourth, the tasks of prognosis and therapeutic recommendations. It will need to provide theoretical resources for transformative social change, which may (non-exhaustively) include: resources for evaluating the likelihood and feasibility of social change; resources for consciousness-raising about the relevant second-order disorders; resources for strategizing, centrally including convincing accounts of the correct targets for social struggle; and, normative resources for collective evaluations of current conditions, goals, strategies, and so on. It should be noted that the critical social theoretic desideratum of clearly articulated and justified normative standards will also help to fulfill the first task of symptomatology, since the latter requires determinate ways of distinguishing between pathological and healthy social formations.
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Surely this is an ambitious set of theoretical tasks, but it seems to me that they follow organically, as it were, from the attempt to actualize critical social theory in the form of diagnoses of contemporary social pathologies. Looking over the substantive analyses of social pathologies presented above in the first part of the paper, I think it warranted to say that Honneth has fulfilled these tasks to a decreasing degree of success. The symptomatologies are phenomenologically well-developed and often convincing in articulating subjectively-felt experiences of second-order disorders, and the distinctions employed between pathological and non-pathological forms of social life are repeatedly based upon the 'formal conception of ethical life' developed out of the theory of recognition. The epidemiological claims are not explicitly vindicated, but since such vindication is a matter of empirical social research, perhaps the diagnoses should be understood as theoretical hypotheses to be tested through well-designed sociological and social-psychological studies, rather than as self-endorsing claims that the phenomena identified are in fact social pathologies. Only in the cases of maldistribution based in distorted esteem dispositives and of organized self-realization do we get the fundaments of an etiological explanation for the root causes of the social pathology. 12 As I indicated throughout, the analyses of ideological recognition, invisibilization, modern rationalization, and especially reification suffer from a lack of substantive sociological details that can move the theory from the action-theoretic description of second-order disorders to institutional, structural, normative, cultural, and/or functional explanations for their social sources. This lacuna is particularly glaring in the cases of ideology and reification, as Honneth there intends to re-animate diagnostic concepts from the earlier history of critical social theory while simultaneously denying the cogency and validity of the underlying explanatory social theory of historical materialism that those earlier diagnoses relied upon. Finally, I would suggest that without a well-developed and Page 25 of 25 relatively detailed etiological account of social pathologies, the tasks of prognosis and therapy cannot even begin to get off the ground. Unsurprisingly, this fourth set of tasks has not yet been even acknowledged, let alone brought to fruition, even as there are some theoretical resources in the general theory of recognition that could be put to productive use. To conclude, I would like to indicate at least three different methodological strategies for fulfilling these tasks-for convenience labeled as 'hermeneutic physiognomy', 'sociological maximalism', and 'pathologyspecific eclecticism'-and make some comments concerning their potential fecundity for the diagnosis of social pathologies.
In a very recent essay, Honneth has admirably clarified the basic methodological structure of Adorno's social theory, separating its truly original contribution of an hermeneutic physiognomy of contemporary social formations from much of the "under-informed, strangely uninspired, and almost dogmatic" substantive explanatory theses and sociological models which that original contribution was often buried within. 13 A central claim of the paper is that we often misunderstand Adorno's social theory as putting forward either descriptive or explanatory claims about the structures and mechanisms of contemporary society. Rather, he was attempting to provide an illuminating sketch of the physical surfaces and appearances of the capitalist form of life that could hermeneutically reveal that form of life as reified, falsely naturalized, oppressive, stultifying, instrumentalizing, endlessly productive of preventable suffering-in a word, as a failed form of life. In not only his social theoretic writings, but also in his aesthetics and philosophy, Adorno tries to develop a method suited to perspicuously depicting the objective meaning of the courses of social action. … By conceptually accenting particular aspects of social reality, it creates figures which exemplify the pathology of reason that has arisen through generalized commodity exchange. … A soon as we manage to produce a particular "figure" with this illustrative function, we at the same time achieve an interpretation, since a whole ensemble of practices, attitudes, or rules becomes comprehensible as a symptom of a failed developmental process.
14 To put the point in terms of the four tasks laid out above, the method of hermeneutic physiognomy at most intends to fulfill the first two tasks of symptomatology and epidemiology, while explicitly forswearing the latter two tasks of etiology and prognosis. The claim is, in effect, is that a social theory intending to fulfill all four tasks is overly-ambitious, though support for the rejection of more ambitious social theory construction is not articulated here. What Honneth does say, somewhat cryptically, is that the purpose of his own reconstruction of Adorno's hermeneutic method and its resulting diagnosis of the pathologies of a capitalist form of life is "in attempting to defend Adorno's analysis of capitalism for the present."
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Aside from engaging in questions of textual or scholarly interpretation of Adorno's corpus, the crucial question here is whether or not hermeneutic physiognomy is adequate to the diagnosis of social pathologies. As I see it, the main problem with such a strategy is that, even at best-when the evocative theoretical description of contemporary forms of suffering does crystallize illuminatingly some particular configuration of felt responses to social reality-it still fails to connect up these experiences to causes. This is because such a method deliberately aims not only For instance, the phenomenon of group-specific invisibilization seems open to a relatively straightforward analysis where the second-order disorders are caused largely by cognitive and evaluative schemas that are unjustifiably group-differentiated, so that the prognosis for healing the social pathologies is relatively good: the therapy consists largely of deliberate and organized strategies for changing extant cultural patterns that systematically serve to further the oppression of denigrated group members. In contrast, the social pathologies associated with maldistributive injustice cannot be explained only in terms of distorted cultural patterns of cognition and evaluation. To be not only accurate but also useful for emancipatory ends, then, critical social theory would here need to go beyond an account of distorted esteem dispositives to incorporate analyses of the relatively autochthonous functional imperatives of capitalist economies and of the structural transformations of both legal systems and global political relations between nation states. 17 Prognosis and therapeutic suggestions would then assume a quite different character than they do with respect to invisibilization. Such mid-level methodological eclecticism, neither exclusively descriptive in intent nor grandiose in explanatory ambition, at least then promises to be able to provide the resources a critical social theory needs to carry forward its emancipatory intentions.
12/18/06 Page 32 of 32 I take it that phenomenon-specific eclecticism is precisely the methodological strategy adopted in
Honneth's analysis of organized self-realization, where he posits elective affinities between various distinct developmental processes that follow their own inner logics but nevertheless coalesce in the specific pathological formation of contemporary institutionalized individualism.
Hermeneutic physiognomy and other descriptive strategies are insufficiently explanatory;
sociological maximalism threatens to become conceptually and analytically disconnected from the specific social pathologies at issue. What we would seem to need rather are convincing, pathologically-appropriate descriptions and explanations for socially-experienced second-order disorders, accounts that can fulfill the various tasks of symptomatology, epidemiology, etiology, and prognosis and therapy. I would suggest that the social diagnoses Honneth has so far engaged in have fulfilled the first two sets of tasks to a much greater extent than the third and fourth ones.
In a word then, this paper is a call for more attention to the explanatory tasks of social theory to complement the theory of recognition's ontogenetic and normative strengths, and render the provocative diagnoses of social pathologies useful for a reinvigorated critical social theory.
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14 Ibid.: 56. 15 Ibid.: 51. I say "somewhat cryptically" because this is the only sentence of its kind in the essay, and it is frankly ambiguous whether Honneth is interested in defending the method of hermeneutic physiognomy, the substance of Adorno's critique of the capitalist form of life, or both. 16 One might object here that the problem I am identifying between the technical explanatory language of sociological maximalism and the mundane language in which symptomatic experiences and social movement reactions to them is really nothing more than a problem of translating the results of expert discourses into understandable language. My intuition, however, is that the much greater diagnostic acumen and accuracy of theories starting from phenomenological and action-theoretic bases, in comparison to those starting from an encompassing sociological explanatory theory, is constitutively tied to the original choice of methodological strategies. Said another way, the problem is not just in translating explanatory claims into prognostic and therapeutic resources; it is also in perspicaciously identifying social pathologies in the first place.
